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Abstract
When Kurt Go¨del layed the foundations of theoretical computer science in
1931, he also introduced essential concepts of the theory of Artificial Intelligence
(AI). Although much of subsequent AI research has focused on heuristics, which
still play a major role in many practical AI applications, in the new millennium AI
theory has finally become a full-fledged formal science, with important optimality
results for embodied agents living in unknown environments, obtained through a
combination of theory a` la Go¨del and probability theory. Here we look back at
important milestones of AI history, mention essential recent results, and speculate
about what we may expect from the next 25 years, emphasizing the significance
of the ongoing dramatic hardware speedups, and discussing Go¨del-inspired, self-
referential, self-improving universal problem solvers.
1 Highlights of AI History—From Go¨del to 2006
Go¨del and Lilienfeld. In 1931, 75 years ago and just a few years after Julius Lilien-
feld patented the transistor, Kurt Go¨del layed the foundations of theoretical computer
science (CS) with his work on universal formal languages and the limits of proof and
computation [5]. He constructed formal systems allowing for self-referential state-
ments that talk about themselves, in particular, about whether they can be derived from
a set of given axioms through a computational theorem proving procedure. Go¨del went
on to construct statements that claim their own unprovability, to demonstrate that tra-
ditional math is either flawed in a certain algorithmic sense or contains unprovable but
true statements.
Go¨del’s incompleteness result is widely regarded as the most remarkable achieve-
ment of 20th century mathematics, although some mathematicians say it is logic, not
math, and others call it the fundamental result of theoretical computer science, a dis-
cipline that did not yet officially exist back then but was effectively created through
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Go¨del’s work. It had enormous impact not only on computer science but also on phi-
losophy and other fields. In particular, since humans can “see” the truth of Go¨del’s
unprovable statements, some researchers mistakenly thought that his results show that
machines and Artificial Intelligences (AIs) will always be inferior to humans. Given
the tremendous impact of Go¨del’s results on AI theory, it does make sense to date AI’s
beginnings back to his 1931 publication 75 years ago.
Zuse and Turing. In 1936 Alan Turing [37] introduced the Turing machine to re-
formulate Go¨del’s results and Alonzo Church’s extensions thereof. TMs are often more
convenient than Go¨del’s integer-based formal systems, and later became a central tool
of CS theory. Simultaneously Konrad Zuse built the first working program-controlled
computers (1935-1941), using the binary arithmetic and the bits of Gottfried Wilhelm
von Leibniz (1701) instead of the more cumbersome decimal system used by Charles
Babbage, who pioneered the concept of program-controlled computers in the 1840s,
and tried to build one, although without success. By 1941, all the main ingredients of
‘modern’ computer science were in place, a decade after Go¨del’s paper, a century after
Babbage, and roughly three centuries after Wilhelm Schickard, who started the his-
tory of automatic computing hardware by constructing the first non-program-controlled
computer in 1623.
In the 1940s Zuse went on to devise the first high-level programming language
(Plankalku¨l), which he used to write the first chess program. Back then chess-playing
was considered an intelligent activity, hence one might call this chess program the first
design of an AI program, although Zuse did not really implement it back then. Soon
afterwards, in 1948, Claude Shannon [33] published information theory, recycling sev-
eral older ideas such as Ludwig Boltzmann’s entropy from 19th century statistical me-
chanics, and the bit of information (Leibniz, 1701).
Relays, Tubes, Transistors. Alternative instances of transistors, the concept pio-
neered and patented by Julius Edgar Lilienfeld (1920s) and Oskar Heil (1935), were
built by William Shockley, Walter H. Brattain & John Bardeen (1948: point contact
transistor) as well as Herbert F. Matare´ & Heinrich Walker (1948, exploiting transcon-
ductance effects of germanium diodes observed in the Luftwaffe during WW-II). Today
most transistors are of the field-effect type a` la Lilienfeld & Heil. In principle a switch
remains a switch no matter whether it is implemented as a relay or a tube or a transis-
tor, but transistors switch faster than relays (Zuse, 1941) and tubes (Colossus, 1943;
ENIAC, 1946). This eventually led to significant speedups of computer hardware,
which was essential for many subsequent AI applications.
The I in AI. In 1950, some 56 years ago, Turing invented a famous subjective test
to decide whether a machine or something else is intelligent. 6 years later, and 25
years after Go¨del’s paper, John McCarthy finally coined the term “AI”. 50 years later,
in 2006, this prompted some to celebrate the 50th birthday of AI, but this chapter’s
title should make clear that its author cannot agree with this view—it is the thing that
counts, not its name.
Roots of Probability-Based AI. In the 1960s and 1970s Ray Solomonoff com-
bined theoretical CS and probability theory to establish a general theory of universal
inductive inference and predictive AI [35] closely related to the concept of Kolmogorov
complexity [14]. His theoretically optimal predictors and their Bayesian learning algo-
rithms only assume that the observable reactions of the environment in response to cer-
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tain action sequences are sampled from an unknown probability distribution contained
in a set M of all enumerable distributions. That is, given an observation sequence we
only assume there exists a computer program that can compute the probabilities of the
next possible observations. This includes all scientific theories of physics, of course.
Since we typically do not know this program, we predict using a weighted sum ξ of all
distributions in M, where the sum of the weights does not exceed 1. It turns out that
this is indeed the best one can possibly do, in a very general sense [11, 35]. Although
the universal approach is practically infeasible since M contains infinitely many dis-
tributions, it does represent the first sound and general theory of optimal prediction
based on experience, identifying the limits of both human and artificial predictors, and
providing a yardstick for all prediction machines to come.
AI vs Astrology? Unfortunately, failed prophecies of human-level AI with just a
tiny fraction of the brain’s computing power discredited some of the AI research in
the 1960s and 70s. Many theoretical computer scientists actually regarded much of the
field with contempt for its perceived lack of hard theoretical results. ETH Zurich’s Tur-
ing award winner and creator of the PASCAL programming language, Niklaus Wirth,
did not hesitate to link AI to astrology. Practical AI of that era was dominated by
rule-based expert systems and Logic Programming. That is, despite Solomonoff’s fun-
damental results, a main focus of that time was on logical, deterministic deduction of
facts from previously known facts, as opposed to (probabilistic) induction of hypothe-
ses from experience.
Evolution, Neurons, Ants. Largely unnoticed by mainstream AI gurus of that
era, a biology-inspired type of AI emerged in the 1960s when Ingo Rechenberg pi-
oneered the method of artificial evolution to solve complex optimization tasks [22],
such as the design of optimal airplane wings or combustion chambers of rocket noz-
zles. Such methods (and later variants thereof, e.g., Holland [10] (1970s), often gave
better results than classical approaches. In the following decades, other types of “sub-
symbolic” AI also became popular, especially neural networks. Early neural net pa-
pers include those of McCulloch & Pitts, 1940s (linking certain simple neural nets to
old and well-known, simple mathematical concepts such as linear regression); Min-
sky & Papert [17] (temporarily discouraging neural network research), Kohonen [12],
Amari, 1960s; Werbos [40], 1970s; and many others in the 1980s. Orthogonal ap-
proaches included fuzzy logic (Zadeh, 1960s), Rissanen’s practical variants [23] of
Solomonoff’s universal method, “representation-free” AI (Brooks [2]), Artificial Ants
(Dorigo & Gambardella [4], 1990s), statistical learning theory (in less general settings
than those studied by Solomonoff) & support vector machines (Vapnik [38] and oth-
ers). As of 2006, this alternative type of AI research is receiving more attention than
“Good Old-Fashioned AI” (GOFAI).
Mainstream AI Marries Statistics. A dominant theme of the 1980s and 90s was
the marriage of mainstream AI and old concepts from probability theory. Bayes net-
works, Hidden Markov Models, and numerous other probabilistic models found wide
applications ranging from pattern recognition, medical diagnosis, data mining, machine
translation, robotics, etc.
Hardware Outshining Software: Humanoids, Robot Cars, Etc. In the 1990s
and 2000s, much of the progress in practical AI was due to better hardware, getting
roughly 1000 times faster per Euro per decade. In 1995, a fast vision-based robot car
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by Ernst Dickmanns (whose team built the world’s first reliable robot cars in the early
1980s with the help of Mercedes-Benz, e. g., [3]) autonomously drove 1000 miles
from Munich to Denmark and back, in traffic at up to 120 mph, automatically passing
other cars (a safety driver took over only rarely in critical situations). Japanese labs
(Honda, Sony) and Pfeiffer’s lab at TU Munich built famous humanoid walking robots.
Engineering problems often seemed more challenging than AI-related problems.
Another source of progress was the dramatically improved access to all kinds of
data through the WWW, created by Tim Berners-Lee at the European particle col-
lider CERN (Switzerland) in 1990. This greatly facilitated and encouraged all kinds
of “intelligent” data mining applications. However, there were few if any obvious fun-
damental algorithmic breakthroughs; improvements / extensions of already existing
algorithms seemed less impressive and less crucial than hardware advances. For ex-
ample, chess world champion Kasparov was beaten by a fast IBM computer running
a fairly standard algorithm. Rather simple but computationally expensive probabilistic
methods for speech recognition, statistical machine translation, computer vision, opti-
mization, virtual realities etc. started to become feasible on PCs, mainly because PCs
had become 1000 times more powerful within a decade or so.
2006. As noted by Stefan Artmann (personal communication, 2006), today’s AI
textbooks seem substantially more complex and less unified than those of several decades
ago, e. g., [18], since they have to cover so many apparently quite different subjects.
There seems to be a need for a new unifying view of intelligence. In the author’s
opinion this view already exists, as will be discussed below.
2 Subjective Selected Highlights of Present AI
The more recent some event, the harder it is to judge its long-term significance. But
this biased author thinks that the most important thing that happened recently in AI
is the begin of a transition from a heuristics-dominated science (e.g., [24]) to a real
formal science. Let us elaborate on this topic.
2.1 The Two Ways of Making a Dent in AI Research
There are at least two convincing ways of doing AI research: (1) construct a (possibly
heuristic) machine or algorithm that somehow (it does not really matter how) solves
a previously unsolved interesting problem, such as beating the best human player of
Go (success will outshine any lack of theory). Or (2) prove that a particular novel
algorithm is optimal for an important class of AI problems.
It is the nature of heuristics (case (1)) that they lack staying power, as they may
soon get replaced by next year’s even better heuristics. Theorems (case (2)), however,
are for eternity. That’s why formal sciences prefer theorems.
For example, probability theory became a formal science centuries ago, and totally
formal in 1933 with Kolmogorov’s axioms [13], shortly after Go¨del’s paper [5]. Old but
provably optimal techniques of probability theory are still in every day’s use, and in fact
highly significant for modern AI, while many initially successful heuristic approaches
eventually became unfashionable, of interest mainly to the historians of the field.
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2.2 No Brain Without a Body / AI Becoming a Formal Science
Heuristic approaches will continue to play an important role in many AI applications,
to the extent they empirically outperform competing methods. But like with all young
sciences at the transition point between an early intuition-dominated and a later formal
era, the importance of mathematical optimality theorems is growing quickly. Progress
in the formal era, however, is and will be driven by a different breed of researchers, a
fact that is not necessarily universally enjoyed and welcomed by all the earlier pioneers.
Today the importance of embodied, embedded AI is almost universally acknowl-
edged (e. g., [20]), as obvious from frequently overheard remarks such as “let the
physics compute” and “no brain without a body.” Many present AI researchers focus
on real robots living in real physical environments. To some of them the title of this
subsection may seem oxymoronic: the extension of AI into the realm of the physical
body seems to be a step away from formalism. But the new millennium’s formal point
of view is actually taking this step into account in a very general way, through the first
mathematical theory of universal embedded AI, combining “old” theoretical computer
science and “ancient” probability theory to derive optimal behavior for embedded, em-
bodied rational agents living in unknown but learnable environments. More on this
below.
2.3 What’s the I in AI? What is Life? Etc.
Before we proceed, let us clarify what we are talking about. Shouldn’t researchers on
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Artificial Life (AL) agree on basic questions such as:
What is Intelligence? What is Life? Interestingly they don’t.
Are Cars Alive? For example, AL researchers often offer definitions of life such
as: it must reproduce, evolve, etc. Cars are alive, too, according to most of these def-
initions. For example, cars evolve and multiply. They need complex environments
with car factories to do so, but living animals also need complex environments full
of chemicals and other animals to reproduce — the DNA information by itself does
not suffice. There is no obvious fundamental difference between an organism whose
self-replication information is stored in its DNA, and a car whose self-replication in-
formation is stored in a car builder’s manual in the glove compartment. To copy itself,
the organism needs its mothers womb plus numerous other objects and living beings in
its environment (such as trillions of bacteria inside and outside of the mother’s body).
The car needs iron mines and car part factories and human workers.
What is Intelligence? If we cannot agree on what’s life, or, for that matter, love, or
consciousness (another fashionable topic), how can there be any hope to define intelli-
gence? Turing’s definition (1950, 19 years after Go¨del’s paper) was totally subjective:
intelligent is what convinces me that it is intelligent while I am interacting with it.
Fortunately, however, there are more formal and less subjective definitions.
2.4 Formal AI Definitions
Popper said: all life is problem solving [21]. Instead of defining intelligence in Turing’s
rather vague and subjective way we define intelligence with respect to the abilities of
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universal optimal problem solvers.
Consider a learning robotic agent with a single life which consists of discrete cycles
or time steps t = 1, 2, . . . , T . Its total lifetime T may or may not be known in advance.
In what follows,the value of any time-varying variable Q at time t (1 ≤ t ≤ T ) will be
denoted by Q(t), the ordered sequence of values Q(1), . . . , Q(t) by Q(≤ t), and the
(possibly empty) sequence Q(1), . . . , Q(t− 1) by Q(< t).
At any given t the robot receives a real-valued input vector x(t) from the environ-
ment and executes a real-valued action y(t) which may affect future inputs; at times
t < T its goal is to maximize future success or utility
u(t) = Eµ
[
T∑
τ=t+1
r(τ)
∣∣∣∣∣ h(≤ t)
]
, (1)
where r(t) is an additional real-valued reward input at time t, h(t) the ordered triple
[x(t), y(t), r(t)] (hence h(≤ t) is the known history up to t), and Eµ(· | ·) denotes the
conditional expectation operator with respect to some possibly unknown distribution µ
from a set M of possible distributions. Here M reflects whatever is known about the
possibly probabilistic reactions of the environment. For example, M may contain all
computable distributions [11, 35]. Note that unlike in most previous work by others
[36], there is just one life, no need for predefined repeatable trials, no restriction to
Markovian interfaces between sensors and environment, and the utility function im-
plicitly takes into account the expected remaining lifespan Eµ(T | h(≤ t)) and thus
the possibility to extend it through appropriate actions [29].
Any formal problem or sequence of problems can be encoded in the reward func-
tion. For example, the reward functions of many living or robotic beings cause occa-
sional hunger or pain or pleasure signals etc. At time t an optimal AI will make the
best possible use of experience h(≤ t) to maximize u(t). But how?
2.5 Universal, Mathematically Optimal, But Incomputable AI
Unbeknownst to many traditional AI researchers, there is indeed an extremely gen-
eral “best” way of exploiting previous experience. At any time t, the recent theoret-
ically optimal yet practically infeasible reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm AIXI
[11] uses Solomonoff’s above-mentioned universal prediction scheme to select those
action sequences that promise maximal future reward up to some horizon, given the
current data h(≤ t). Using a variant of Solomonoff’s universal probability mixture ξ,
in cycle t+1, AIXI selects as its next action the first action of an action sequence max-
imizing ξ-predicted reward up to the horizon. Hutter’s recent work [11] demonstrated
AIXI’s optimal use of observations as follows. The Bayes-optimal policy pξ based on
the mixture ξ is self-optimizing in the sense that its average utility value converges
asymptotically for all µ ∈ M to the optimal value achieved by the (infeasible) Bayes-
optimal policy pµ which knows µ in advance. The necessary condition that M admits
self-optimizing policies is also sufficient.
Of course one cannot claim the old AI is devoid of formal research! The recent
approach above, however, goes far beyond previous formally justified but very limited
AI-related approaches ranging from linear perceptrons [17] to the A∗-algorithm [18].
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It provides, for the first time, a mathematically sound theory of general AI and optimal
decision making based on experience, identifying the limits of both human and artificial
intelligence, and a yardstick for any future, scaled-down, practically feasible approach
to general AI.
2.6 Optimal Curiosity and Creativity
No theory of AI will be convincing if it does not explain curiosity and creativity, which
many consider as important ingredients of intelligence. We can provide an explana-
tion in the framework of optimal reward maximizers such as those from the previous
subsection.
It is possible to come up with theoretically optimal ways of improving the predic-
tive world model of a curious robotic agent [28], extending earlier ideas on how to
implement artificial curiosity [25]: The rewards of an optimal reinforcement learner
are the predictor’s improvements on the observation history so far. They encourage
the reinforcement learner to produce action sequences that cause the creation and the
learning of new, previously unknown regularities in the sensory input stream. It turns
out that art and creativity can be explained as by-products of such intrinsic curiosity re-
wards: good observer-dependent art deepens the observer’s insights about this world or
possible worlds, connecting previously disconnected patterns in an initially surprising
way that eventually becomes known and boring. While previous attempts at describing
what is satisfactory art or music were informal, this work permits the first technical,
formal approach to understanding the nature of art and creativity [28].
2.7 Computable, Asymptotically Optimal General Problem Solver
Using the Speed Prior [26] one can scale down the universal approach above such
that it becomes computable. In what follows we will mention general methods whose
optimality criteria explicitly take into account the computational costs of prediction
and decision making—compare [15].
The recent asymptotically optimal search algorithm for all well-defined problems
[11] allocates part of the total search time to searching the space of proofs for provably
correct candidate programs with provable upper runtime bounds; at any given time it
focuses resources on those programs with the currently best proven time bounds. The
method is as fast as the initially unknown fastest problem solver for the given problem
class, save for a constant slowdown factor of at most 1 + ǫ, ǫ > 0, and an additive
constant that does not depend on the problem instance!
Is this algorithm then the holy grail of computer science? Unfortunately not quite,
since the additive constant (which disappears in the O()-notation of theoretical CS)
may be huge, and practical applications may not ignore it. This motivates the next
section, which addresses all kinds of formal optimality (not just asymptotic optimality).
2.8 Fully Self-Referential, Self-Improving Go¨del Machine
We may use Go¨del’s self-reference trick to build a universal general, fully self-referential,
self-improving, optimally efficient problem solver [29]. A Go¨del Machine is a com-
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puter whose original software includes axioms describing the hardware and the original
software (this is possible without circularity) plus whatever is known about the (proba-
bilistic) environment plus some formal goal in form of an arbitrary user-defined utility
function, e.g., cumulative future expected reward in a sequence of optimization tasks -
see equation (1). The original software also includes a proof searcher which uses the
axioms (and possibly an online variant of Levin’s universal search [15]) to systemati-
cally make pairs (“proof”, “program”) until it finds a proof that a rewrite of the original
software through “program” will increase utility. The machine can be designed such
that each self-rewrite is necessarily globally optimal in the sense of the utility function,
even those rewrites that destroy the proof searcher [29].
2.9 Practical Algorithms for Program Learning
The theoretically optimal universal methods above are optimal in ways that do not
(yet) immediately yield practically feasible general problem solvers, due to possibly
large initial overhead costs. Which are today’s practically most promising extensions
of traditional machine learning?
Since virtually all realistic sensory inputs of robots and other cognitive systems
are sequential by nature, the future of machine learning and AI in general depends on
progress in in sequence processing as opposed to the traditional processing of stationary
input patterns. To narrow the gap between learning abilities of humans and machines,
we will have to study how to learn general algorithms instead of such reactive map-
pings. Most traditional methods for learning time series and mappings from sequences
to sequences, however, are based on simple time windows: one of the numerous feed-
forward ML techniques such as feedforward neural nets (NN) [1] or support vector
machines [38] is used to map a restricted, fixed time window of sequential input values
to desired target values. Of course such approaches are bound to fail if there are tem-
poral dependencies exceeding the time window size. Large time windows, on the other
hand, yield unacceptable numbers of free parameters.
Presently studied, rather general sequence learners include certain probabilistic ap-
proaches and especially recurrent neural networks (RNNs), e.g., [19]. RNNs have
adaptive feedback connections that allow them to learn mappings from input sequences
to output sequences. They can implement any sequential, algorithmic behavior imple-
mentable on a personal computer. In gradient-based RNNs, however, we can differ-
entiate our wishes with respect to programs, to obtain a search direction in algorithm
space. RNNs are biologically more plausible and computationally more powerful than
other adaptive models such as Hidden Markov Models (HMMs - no continuous in-
ternal states), feedforward networks & Support Vector Machines (no internal states at
all). For several reasons, however, the first RNNs could not learn to look far back
into the past. This problem was overcome by RNNs of the Long Short-Term Memory
type (LSTM), currently the most powerful and practical supervised RNN architecture
for many applications, trainable either by gradient descent [9] or evolutionary methods
[32], occasionally profiting from a marriage with probabilistic approaches [8].
Unsupervised RNNs that learn without a teacher to control physical processes or
robots frequently use evolutionary algorithms [10, 22] to learn appropriate programs
(RNN weight matrices) through trial and error [41]. Recent work brought progress
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through a focus on reducing search spaces by co-evolving the comparatively small
weight vectors of individual recurrent neurons [7]. Such RNNs can learn to create
memories of important events, solving numerous RL / optimization tasks unsolvable
by traditional RL methods [6, 7]. They are among the most promising methods for
practical program learning, and currently being applied to the control of sophisticated
robots such as the walking biped of TU Munich [16].
3 The Next 25 Years
Where will AI research stand in 2031, 25 years from now, 100 years after Go¨del’s
ground-breaking paper [5], some 200 years after Babbage’s first designs, some 400
years after the first automatic calculator by Schickard (and some 2000 years after the
crucifixion of the man whose birth year anchors the Western calendar)?
Trivial predictions are those that just naively extrapolate the current trends, such
as: computers will continue to get faster by a factor of roughly 1000 per decade; hence
they will be at least a million times faster by 2031. According to frequent estimates,
current supercomputers achieve roughly 1 percent of the raw computational power of
a human brain, hence those of 2031 will have 10,000 “brain powers”; and even cheap
devices will achieve many brain powers. Many tasks that are hard for today’s soft-
ware on present machines will become easy without even fundamentally changing the
algorithms. This includes numerous pattern recognition and control tasks arising in
factories of many industries, currently still employing humans instead of robots.
Will theoretical advances and practical software keep up with the hardware devel-
opment? We are convinced they will. As discussed above, the new millennium has
already brought fundamental new insights into the problem of constructing theoreti-
cally optimal rational agents or universal AIs, even if those do not yet immediately
translate into practically feasible methods. On the other hand, on a more practical
level, there has been rapid progress in learning algorithms for agents interacting with a
dynamic environment, autonomously discovering true sequence-processing, problem-
solving programs, as opposed to the reactive mappings from stationary inputs to outputs
studied in most of traditional machine learning research. In the author’s opinion the
above-mentioned theoretical and practical strands are going to converge. In conjunc-
tion with the ongoing hardware advances this will yield non-universal but nevertheless
rather general artificial problem-solvers whose capabilities will exceed those of most
if not all humans in many domains of commercial interest. This may seem like a bold
prediction to some, but it is actually a trivial one as there are so many experts who
would agree with it.
Nontrivial predictions are those that anticipate truly unexpected, revolutionary
breakthroughs. By definition, these are hard to predict. For example, in 1985 only very
few scientists and science fiction authors predicted the WWW revolution of the 1990s.
The few who did were not influential enough to make a significant part of humanity
believe in their predictions and prepare for their coming true. Similarly, after the latest
stock market crash one can always find with high probability some “prophet in the
desert” who predicted it in advance, but had few if any followers until the crash really
occurred.
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Truly nontrivial predictions are those that most will not believe until they come
true. We will mostly restrict ourselves to trivial predictions like those above and refrain
from too much speculation in form of nontrivial ones. However, we may have a look
at previous unexpected scientific breakthroughs and try to discern a pattern, a pattern
that may not allow us to precisely predict the details of the next revolution but at least
its timing.
3.1 A Pattern in the History of Revolutions?
Let us put the AI-oriented developments [27] discussed above in a broader context, and
look at the history of major scientific revolutions and essential historic developments
(that is, the subjects of the major chapters in history books) since the beginnings of
modern man over 40,000 years ago [30, 31]. Amazingly, they seem to match a binary
logarithmic scale marking exponentially declining temporal intervals [31], each half
the size of the previous one, and measurable in terms of powers of 2 multiplied by a
human lifetime (roughly 80 years—throughout recorded history many individuals have
reached this age, although the average lifetime often was shorter, mostly due to high
children mortality). It looks as if history itself will converge in a historic singular-
ity or Omega point Ω around 2040 (the term historic singularity is apparently due to
Stanislaw Ulam (1950s) and was popularized by Vernor Vinge [39] in the 1990s). To
convince yourself of history’s convergence, associate an error bar of not much more
than 10 percent with each date below:
1. Ω− 29 lifetimes: modern humans start colonizing the world from Africa
2. Ω− 28 lifetimes: bow and arrow invented; hunting revolution
3. Ω−27 lifetimes: invention of agriculture; first permanent settlements; beginnings
of civilization
4. Ω − 26 lifetimes: first high civilizations (Sumeria, Egypt), and the most impor-
tant invention of recorded history, namely, the one that made recorded history
possible: writing
5. Ω−25 lifetimes: the ancient Greeks invent democracy and lay the foundations of
Western science and art and philosophy, from algorithmic procedures and formal
proofs to anatomically perfect sculptures, harmonic music, and organized sports.
Old Testament written (basis of Judaism, Christianity, Islam); major Asian reli-
gions founded. High civilizations in China, origin of the first calculation tools,
and India, origin of alphabets and the zero
6. Ω − 24 lifetimes: bookprint (often called the most important invention of the
past 2000 years) invented in China. Islamic science and culture start spreading
across large parts of the known world (this has sometimes been called the most
important event between Antiquity and the age of discoveries)
7. Ω− 23 lifetimes: the Mongolian Empire, the largest and most dominant empire
ever (possibly including most of humanity and the world economy), stretches
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across Asia from Korea all the way to Germany. Chinese fleets and later also
European vessels start exploring the world. Gun powder and guns invented in
China. Rennaissance and Western bookprint (often called the most influential
invention of the past 1000 years) and subsequent Reformation in Europe. Begin
of the Scientific Revolution
8. Ω− 22 lifetimes: Age of enlightenment and rational thought in Europe. Massive
progress in the sciences; first flying machines; first steam engines prepare the
industrial revolution
9. Ω − 2 lifetimes: Second industrial revolution based on combustion engines,
cheap electricity, and modern chemistry. Birth of modern medicine through the
germ theory of disease; genetic and evolution theory. European colonialism at
its short-lived peak
10. Ω − 1 lifetime: modern post-World War II society and pop culture emerges;
superpower stalemate based on nuclear deterrence. The 20th century super-
exponential population explosion (from 1.6 billion to 6 billion people, mainly
due to the Haber-Bosch process [34]) is at its peak. First spacecraft and com-
mercial computers; DNA structure unveiled
11. Ω− 1/2 lifetime (now): for the first time in history most of the most destructive
weapons are dismantled, after the Cold War’s peaceful end. 3rd industrial revo-
lution based on personal computers and the World Wide Web. A mathematical
theory of universal AI emerges (see sections above) - will this be considered a
milestone in the future?
12. Ω − 1/4 lifetime: This point will be reached around 2020. By then many com-
puters will have substantially more raw computing power than human brains.
13. Ω−1/8 lifetime (100 years after Go¨del’s paper): will practical variants of Go¨del
machines start a runaway evolution of continually self-improving superminds
way beyond human imagination, causing far more unpredictable revolutions in
the final decade before Ω than during all the millennia before?
14. ...
The following disclosure should help the reader to take this list with a grain of salt
though. The author, who admits being very interested in witnessing Ω, was born in
1963, and therefore perhaps should not expect to live long past 2040. This may mo-
tivate him to uncover certain historic patterns that fit his desires, while ignoring other
patterns that do not. Perhaps there even is a general rule for both the individual memory
of single humans and the collective memory of entire societies and their history books:
constant amounts of memory space get allocated to exponentially larger, adjacent time
intervals further and further into the past. Maybe that’s why there has never been a
shortage of prophets predicting that the end is near - the important events according
to one’s own view of the past always seem to accelerate exponentially. See [31] for a
more thorough discussion of this possibility.
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